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A study of arbitration clauses
in consumer and
non-consumer contracts
by THEODORE EISENBERG, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, and EMILY SHERWIN
andatory arbitration clauses have been in the spot-
light recently, as consumer advocates have chal-
lenged their legitimacy. Popular consumer products
such as cellular phone serv-
ice, credit cards, and dis- Mandatory arbitrati
count brokerage often in more than three-
come with fine print con-
tracts in which the cus- contracts examin
tomer agrees to submit one-tenth of non-
disputes to arbitration
rather than to litigate in negotiated by
court. Typically, the cus- suggesting thal
tomer also agrees not to
participate in aggregate in arbitration is cE
proceedings such as class than they h
actions, either in court or
before an arbitrator.
Another common contract provision makes arbitration
clauses and class arbitration waivers non-severable, so that if
an arbitrator authorizes claimants to aggregate their claims,
they must instead proceed in court. The combined effect of
these contractual provisions is to ensure that consumers
will pursue claims individually and before arbitrators, if at
all. Mandatory arbitration clauses also ensure that disputes
between firms and consumers will not be decided byjuries.
Not surprisingly, firms that include arbitration clauses
in their contracts with consumers have taken a strong
public stand on the benefits of arbitration, not only for
themselves but for their customers. In litigation testing
the validity of mandatory consumer arbitration, briefs on
behalf of corporate defendants and industry groups
repeatedly assert that arbitration saves both parties time
and money and yields fair results for consumers.' Propo-
nents of mandatory arbitration cite high levels of satisfac-
tion and favorable win-rates for claimants, and add that
reducing the costs of dispute resolution for firms means
lower prices for consumers.3
on clauses appeared
quarters of consumer
ed but in less than
consumer contracts
the same firms,
the firms' faith
onsiderably weaker
ave claimed.
Opponents argue that
mandatory arbitration
clauses are imposed on
consumers without full
consent and that arbitra-
tion deprives consumers of
jury trials, reduces awards,
and fails to advance the
public's interest in deter-
rence and law reform.
More pointedly, oppo-
nents object to the use of
arbitration clauses to cur-
tail aggregate proceed-
ings. Without the option of aggregate dispute
resolution, they maintain, small claims are not finan-
cially viable in any forum. As a result, firms will escape
For helpful comments, we thank Jennifer Arlen, Oren Bar-Gill, Yun-chien
Chang, Geerte Hesen, Christopher Leslie, Herbert Kritzer, Michael Levine,
Flornecia Marotta-Wurgler, Larry Ribstein, and participants at the NYU Law
and Economics Workshop and the contracts panel at the 2008 Annual Meet-
ing of the Association of American Law Schools. Benjamin Freshman and
Michael Ernemann provided excellent research assistance. Professor Eisen-
berg serves as a consultant for plaintiffs in a case raising a class action-arbi-
tration issue. An earlier version of this material was published as Arbitration's
Summer Soldiers: An Fmpirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-
consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH.J. L. REFORM 871 (2008).
1. See, e.g., Brief of CTIA-The Wireless Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Affirmance 2, Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash.
2007); Brief of Respondent Cingular Wireless 39, Scott, supra; Discover
Bank's Answer to Anicus Curie [sic] Brief of Consumer Attorneys of Califor-
nia in Support of Real Party in Interest 13-14, Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers'
Ass'n., Am. Financial Services Ass'n., & Consumer Bankers' Ass'n. in Support
of Petitioner Discover Bank 7, Discover, supra.
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ARBITRATION:
PLEASE READ THIS PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT CAREFULLY.
IT PROVIDES THAT ANY DISPUTE MAY BE RESOLVED BY BINDING
ARBITRATION. ARBITRATION REPLACES THE RIGHT TO GO TO COURT,
INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO A JURY AND THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE
IN A CLASS ACTION OR SIMILAR PROCEEDING. IN ARBITRATION, A
DISPUTE IS RESOLVED BY AN ARBITRATOR INSTEAD OF A JUDGE OR
JURY. ARBITRATION PROCEDURES ARE SIMPLER AND MORE LIMITED
THAN COURT PROCEDURES.
Agreement to Arbitrate:
Either you or we may, without the other's consent, elect mandatory,
binding arbitration for any claim, dispute, or controversy between you
and us (called "Claims").
liability for misconduct
that imposes small per
capita losses on large numbers 'I
of consumers? Judicial responses to
mandatory arbitration have been
mixed, although several state courts
have recently found particular arbi-
tration provisions unconscionable.'
Against this background, we con-
ducted a study of contractual prac-
tices by well-known firms marketing
consumer products, comparing the
firms' consumer contracts with con-
tracts the same firms negotiated with
business peers. The frequency of
arbitration clauses in consumer con-
tracts has been studied before, as has
the frequency of arbitration clauses
in non-consumer contracts.7 Our
2. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in
Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes?: An
Analysis of Active Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'LJ. CON-
FLICT MGMT. 369, 378 (1995) (reporting favorable
employee win-rates in employment-related arbi-
tration); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employ-
ment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. Rcv. 29, 45-51 (1998) (citing studies of
win-rates, awards, and participant satisfaction in
arbitration and litigation); Eric J. Mogilnicki &
Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 763-65 (2003) (citing stud-
ies of outcomes in arbitration and litigation).
3. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
Agreements, 2001 J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 89 (2001).
4. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-dispute Mandatory
Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform,
38 HOUSTON L. REv. 1237 (2001); Mark E. Bud-
nitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration, 67 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004); Paul Carrington,
Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361
(2003); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It
just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
study is the first to compare the use
of arbitration clauses within firms, in
different contractual contexts.
The results are striking: in our
sample, mandatory arbitration
clauses appeared in more than three-
5. Samuel Issacharoff & Erin E Delaney, Credit
Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 158 (2006);
Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using
Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Effi-
cient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 103 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d
1000 (Wash. 2007).
7. See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R.
Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predis-
pute Arbitration Clauses, 2004 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55 (2004) (finding that arbitration clauses
appeared in 35% of a varied sample of consumer
contracts); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study ofEx Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of
Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 335
(2007) (finding that arbitration clauses appeared
in 11% of material contracts of large corporate
firms); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dis-
pute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing?, in
Omri Ben-Shahar (ed.) BOILERPLATE: THE FOUN-
nATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 47-48 (2007)
(finding that arbitration clauses appeared in
about 6% of 597 online end-user software
licenses).
quarters of consumer con-
tracts and less than one tenth of
non-consumer contracts (exclud-
ing employment contracts) negoti-
ated by the same firms. This suggests
that the firms' faith in arbitration is
considerably weaker than they have
claimed. For the purpose of business-
to-business disputes, in which they
may be either plaintiffs or defen-
dants, they prefer the option to liti-
gate in court.
We approached our project with
several hypotheses in mind. First,
because the firms we studied, or
trade organizations to which they
belong, have publicly endorsed arbi-
tration as speedy, cost-effective, and
fair, and because speed, cost-effec-
tiveness, and fairness are desirable in
any contractual dispute, one would
expect firms to provide consistently
for arbitration in contracts of all
types. Second, because businesses
have often expressed a skeptical view
of the reliability of juries as fact-find-
ers, one would expect firms to pro-
vide consistently for non-jury trials,
even in the absence of mandatory
arbitration provisions. Neither of
these hypotheses were confirmed by
our data. Instead, both the firms'
preference for arbitration and their
aversity to jury trials pertained pri-
marily to disputes with consumers.
The study
To conduct the study, we first identi-
fied firms with significant market
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Table 1. Companies and contract types
Company Consumer
AT&T 1
AlItel 1
American Express 1
Ameriprise 1
Ameritrade 1
Bank of America 1
Cablevision 3
CellularOne 1
Charles Schwab 2
Charter Commun. 1
Chase 2
Citigroup 2
Comcast 1
Cox 1
ETrade 1
GE/GE Money Bank, 1
Owest 1
Sprint 1
Time Warner 1
U.S. Cellular 1
Verizon 1
Total 26
Contract type
Employment
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
0
0
0
14
Material
contracts
17
12
8
7
8
6
7
9
11
9
6
2
10
1
1
8
7
3
10
5
3
150
Total
18
13
9
8
15
7
10
13
13
11
8
4
11
2
2
9
9
7
11
6
4
190
'GE Money Bank describes itself as "the consumer and small business financial services unit of General Electric."
http://www.gemoney.com/about us/index.htmi, accessed Dec. 14, 2007.
Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form 10 -K filings, Jan. 1, 2006
to Aug. 13, 2007.
Table 2. Rate of arbitration clauses
by contract type
Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
Arbitration clause
Yes
20
76.9
13
92.9
9
6.1
42
23.7
Total
26
100.0
14
100.0
147
100.0
187
100.0
Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form 10-K, Jan. 1, 2006 to
Aug.13, 2007.
shares or name recognition in the
sectors of telecommunications, con-
sumer credit, and discount broker-
age (see Table 1). Most of the firms
are on Fortune magazine's list of the
top 100 American companies; others
are close to the top 100 or well-
known within their industry sector.
We then collected consumer agree-
ments drafted and used by each firm
to regulate ongoing relationships
between the firm and consumers of
its services. The contracts we studied
were current in July and August,
2007. Some were available to anyone
visiting the firm's web site; others
were available through a link or win-
dow that appeared in the process of
placing an order; others were avail-
able only by mail after completing
an order.8
Next, we searched for non-con-
sumer contracts entered into by the
same firm in a data base of required
SEC filings (forms 8-K and 10-K)
from January 1, 2006 to August 13,
2007. (Firms registered with the
SEC must file current and annual
reports listing, among other things,
contracts that materially affect the
company's financial condition.)
Typical filings included stock pur-
chase agreements, credit and secu-
rity agreements, and pooling and
service agreements for loans. Mater-
ial contracts filed with the SEC also
included employment agreements
(usually with key employees) and
related agreements governing bene-
fits and incentives. The economic
significance of all these contracts
suggests that they were negotiated
with care.
Our study covered 21 firms.
Seven of these provide cellular
phone service, five provide "triple
play" cable service (CATV, Internet,
and phone), four provide broker-
age service, and five are banks or
finance companies issuing credit
cards to consumers. We reviewed
26 consumer contracts and 164
non-consumer contracts. Fourteen
of the non-consumer contracts
related to employment. Because
employment contracts differed sig-
nificantly from other non-con-
sumer contracts in their treatment
of arbitration, we segregated these
contracts for separate analysis.
We coded both consumer and
non-consumer contracts for the
presence of mandatory arbitration
8. For example, Walmart (Fortune's #1) provides
credit card applicants with a "disclosure" state-
ment at the time of application, then mails the
full consumer agreement to the customer when
the application is accepted. Telephone requests
for an advance copy of the agreement, prior to
submission of an application containing personal
financial information, were declined on the
ground that the company did not furnish its con-
tracts to 'just anyone." Telephone conversation
with Walmart customer serviceJune 15, 2007. The
consumer contract that Walmart sends is in fact a
contract with GE Money Bank.
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clauses, class action waivers, jury
trial waivers, choice of law provi-
sions, forum selection clauses, and
provisions for payment of costs,
including attorney's fees. If the con-
tract required arbitration, we coded
for waivers of class arbitration, rules
governing arbitration, arbitration
venue selection, and provisions on
fees. We also noted and coded for a
common non-severability provision
stating that in the event aggregate
proceedings are authorized in arbi-
tration, arbitration is no longer
required.
Most significantly, we found that
more than 75 percent of consumer
contracts in our sample included
mandatory arbitration clauses, while
fewer than 10 percent of non-con-
sumer agreements provided for
arbitration (see Table 2). Excluding
employment contracts, which
required arbitration at a very high
rate (90 percent), the comparison is
more dramatic: fewer than 6 per-
cent of non-employment, non-con-
sumer contracts provided for
arbitration. Only 8 of our 21 firms
provided for arbitration in any non-
employment, non-consumer con-
tracts, and no firm provided for
arbitration in more than one such
contract. Thus, in our sample, firms
overwhelmingly selected arbitration
as the method for resolving con-
sumer disputes but left open the
choice of litigation in business-to-
business disputes.
Class-action waivers
Our findings on provisions relating
to aggregation of claims are also sig-
nificant (see Tables 3, 4, and 5).
Every consumer contract with a
mandatory arbitration clause also
included a waiver of the right to par-
ticipate in class-wide arbitration, and
60 percent of consumer contracts
with mandatory arbitration clauses
provided that in the event of class
arbitration, the arbitration clause
would no longer be effective. Thus, if
a court or arbitrator authorized
claimants to arbitrate as a class the
firm could elect to litigate instead.
Eighty percent of consumer contracts
also provided independently for a
Table 3. Pattern of class arbitration waiver
in contracts with arbitration clauses
Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
No
0
0
13
100.0
Class arbitration waiver
Yes
20
100.0
0
0.0
Total
20
100.0
13
100.0
7
100.0
40
100.0
Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
Arbitration clause void if class
arbitration permitted clause void
No Yes Total
8 12 20
40.0 60.0 100.0
13 0 13
100.0 0.0 100.0
7 0 7
100.0 0.0 100.0
28 12 40
70.0 30.0 100.0
No
4
20.0
13
100.0
5
71.4
22
55.0
Class action waiver
Yes Total
16 20
80.0 100.0
0 13
0.0 100.0
2 7
28.6 100.0
18 40
45.0 100.0
Sources for Tables 3, 4, and 5. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form
10-K filings, Jan. 1,2006 to Aug. 13, 2007.
waiver of the right to litigate as a class.
Yet, in the approximately 23 percent
of consumer contracts that did not
require arbitration of disputes, there
were no class action waivers.
Non-consumer contracts looked
quite different. Among the 90 percent
of employment-related contracts that
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE 121
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arbitration
Table 5. Pattern of class action waiver in
contracts with arbitration clauses
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Table 6. Summary of jury trial waiver
clauses by contract type
Sample limited to contracts
without arbitration clauses
(1) (2)
No jury Jury trial
Contract type trial waiver waiver
Consumer (N) 6 0
Percent 100.0 0
Employment (N) 1 0
Percent 100.0 0
Other material
contract (N) 103 35
Percent 74.6 25.4
Total (N) 110 35
Percent 75.9 24.1
Arbitration clauses treated
as jury trial waivers
(3) (4)
No jury Jury trial
trial waiver waiver
6 20
23.1 76.9
1 13
7.1 92.9
Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form 10-K filings, Jan. 1, 2006
to Aug. 13, 2007. Columns (3) and (4) treat arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers.
provided for arbitration, none pre-
cluded class proceedings. Among the
few non-employment, non-consumer
contracts that required arbitration,
only 28 percent provided for a waiver
of class arbitration and none provided
for a waiver of class litigation or for a
litigation option in case class arbitra-
tion was approved.9 Thus, our firms
consistently provided against aggrega-
tion of consumer claims, but did not
rule out aggregate proceedings in
employment-related and business-to-
business disputes.
Jury-trial waivers
Finally, we found that most non-con-
sumer contracts that did not contain
arbitration clauses (75 percent) also
did not contain jury-trial waivers (see
Table 6). Again, consumer contracts
looked quite different: treating
mandatory arbitration clauses as
effective waivers of the right to ajury
trial, more than 75 percent of con-
sumer contracts provided for non-
jury fact-finding. It appears that
firms preferred to eliminate jury tri-
als in consumer disputes (as well as
employment disputes) but preserve
jury trial rights in business-to-busi-
ness disputes.
Marked variation
In sum, despite their rhetorical
stance in favor of arbitration, the
firms in our sample did not uni-
formly include arbitration clauses in
their contracts. Instead, the use of
arbitration clauses varied markedly
according to the contract type: arbi-
tration clauses appeared routinely
in employment contracts (92.9 per-
cent), frequently in consumer con-
tracts (76.9 percent), and rarely in
non-employment, non-consumer
business contracts (6.1 percent). In
consumer contracts, mandatory
arbitration clauses were coupled
uniformly with provisions barring
class arbitration, and frequently
with non-severability clauses and
waivers of class litigation.
This pattern suggests that firms do
not in fact view arbitration as a gener-
ally superior method of dispute reso-
lution that can save time and money
without affecting the fairness of out-
comes. Rather, for the purpose of
resolving important business-to-busi-
ness disputes, they prefer the option
of litigation, without limits on
process. Admittedly, there are objec-
tive differences between consumer
disputes and disputes that arise
under material business contracts.
When negotiating contracts, business
parties may be reluctant to demand
arbitration because the demand
might be taken as signaling a propen-
sity to breach; they might also antici-
pate that in the event of breach, they
can agree to arbitrate if arbitration
appears preferable. Business parties
may also prefer to preserve their
options, reasoning that the nature
and complexity of disputes arising
under major contracts is difficult to
predict. Yet, consumer disputes can
be complex as well, and can develop
in unpredictable ways. Accordingly,
we believe the most plausible expla-
nation for the contractual patterns
we observed is also the simplest: out-
side the context of consumer dis-
putes, firms view arbitration as a less
desirable option than litigation.
We note that in one category of
non-consumer contracts-employ-
ment related contracts-firms
strongly favored arbitration over liti-
gation. This preference, however,
appears to be due to the fact that sen-
ior employees and their corporate
employers have a common interest in
keeping the details of their disputes
confidential; therefore both are likely
to prefer private arbitration over liti-
gation in a public forum.
Motives
In addition to implying that the
public support consumer-sector
firms have voiced for arbitration
does not extend to non-employ-
ment, non-consumer disputes, our
data lend support to the argument
that a significant motive for manda-
tory arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts is to prevent aggregation
of consumers' claims. Data aside,
this is a plausible argument. For sev-
eral reasons, firms naturally prefer
to face consumer claims individually
rather than in aggregate proceed-
ings. Aggregation of claims creates
settlement pressure, as firms seek to
avoid the risk of a large damage
award. Moreover, when the damage
caused to each consumer is small,
individual claims may not be viable,
even in arbitration. If so, avoiding
an aggregate proceeding may mean
avoiding liability altogether. Yet, a
9. In these respects, the differences between
consumer agreements and non-consumer agree-
ments are statistically significant at p<0.001.
122 JUDICATURE Volume 92, Number 3 November-December 2008
HeinOnline -- 92 Judicature 122 2008-2009
straightforward contractual waiver
of class-wide dispute resolution
might be invalidated by courts on
grounds of unconscionability, and
in any event a direct attempt to sup-
press aggregate claims might be
unwise from the standpoint of pub-
lic relations.
Arbitration clauses, in contrast,
allow firms to argue that they are
adopting dispute resolution proce-
dures in the best interest of their
customers. Moreover, arbitration
clauses are protected by a federal
policy in favor of arbitration, which
courts have adopted by interpreta-
tion of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Thus, a class action waiver embed-
ded in an arbitration clause may
have a better chance of survival
than a class action waiver standing
alone.1"
Our data, while not conclusive,
tend to confirm this account of com-
pany motives. As noted, most of the
consumer contracts studied con-
tained both mandatory arbitration
clauses and class waiver provisions.
This correlation did not hold true in
employment contracts, which typi-
cally contained mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses but no class waiver
provisions. Although the sample of
non-employment, non-consumer
agreements with arbitration clauses
was rather small (9), only two of
these contracts combined arbitration
with a class waiver provision.
A further point is that a majority of
consumer contracts (and no other
contracts) contained nonseverability
clauses, which eliminated the arbitra-
tion requirement in the event of a
judicial or arbitral decision to author-
ize class arbitration. Thus, it appears
that when consumers proceed as a
class, firms prefer litigation over arbi-
tration. We can speculate about vari-
ous reasons for this preference: firms
may expect courts to apply stricter
class certification requirements than
arbitrators; defense lawyers may have
10. Gilles, supra n. 4 (describing a dramatic rise
in the use of arbitration clauses in the wake of
favorable federal decisions, coincident with an
increase in corporate anxiety over consumer class
actions).
11. Demaine & Hensler, supra n. 7, at 63-64.
more experience with class litigation
than with class arbitration and prefer
to proceed on familiar ground; firms
may fear that arbitrators will be
inclined to split the difference
between parties rather than rule deci-
sively in their favor; and firms may
wish to preserve their right to appeal
large judgments. In any event, the
high incidence of these clauses in
consumer contracts suggests that
from the firms' point of view, con-
cerns about class arbitration by con-
sumers quickly overwhelms whatever
benefits arbitration may hold.
The high incidence of arbitration
clauses in the particular types of con-
sumer contracts we studied also pro-
vides indirect support for the theory
that firms use mandatory arbitration
clauses as a strategy to suppress aggre-
gate proceedings by consumers.
Other studies suggest that the rate of
arbitration clauses in consumer con-
tracts varies by industry type: in some
categories (including ours) arbitra-
tion clauses are prevalent; in others
they are comparatively rare. For
example, in a 2004 study of consumer
contracts by Linda Demaine and Deb-
orah Hensler, the rate of arbitration
clauses in 21 contract categories was
less than 10 percent, while the overall
rate was 35 percent-less than half
the rate we observed." To some
extent, this variation may reflect
industry concentration: the sectors we
studied (cellular phone service,
telecommunications, credit cards, dis-
count brokerage) are dominated by a
small number of firms, making it
harder for consumers to shop for
terms. More significantly, in the sec-
tors we studied, firm practices and
policies are particularly likely to cause
minor harms to many similarly situ-
ated customers. As a result, firms in
these sectors have particular reason to
avoid class claims: consumers who are
not likely to proceed individually
against the firm present a substantial
economic threat when they are able
to aggregate their claims. In contrast,
firms in sectors for which rate of arbi-
tration clauses is low (rental property
managers, grocers, restaurants, and
the like) are less likely to face class
claims for small individual losses.
Our data are also consistent with
the view that firms are suspicious of
juries as fact-finders in consumer dis-
putes, and use arbitration clauses to
avoid them. Overall, we found a
fairly low rate of jury trial waivers in
our sample of contracts (just over 25
percent in contracts without arbitra-
tion clauses). However, arbitration
clauses, which appeared in more
than 75 percent of consumer agree-
ments, effectively preclude jury tri-
als. Thus, firms may view mandatory
arbitration as a way to circumvent
both aggregation of claims and fact-
finding by juries, under the guise of
a consumer-friendly mechanism for
dispute resolution.
Overall, our study suggests that the
asserted benefits of arbitration-fair
outcomes arrived at faster and at
lower cost-are not the dominant
motives for inclusion of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts in the
industries we studied. Firms that
required arbitration of consumer
disputes did not favor arbitration in
their non-consumer contracts. The
most likely explanation for the pat-
tern we observed is that firms value
arbitration clauses for their effects in
suppressing aggregate proceedings
by consumers, and perhaps averting
liability for widespread but low-value
wrongs. V
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